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NO EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN BANK
RECORDS-UNITED STATES V. MILLER
Whether an individual reasonably can expect that records kept inci-
dental to his personal banking transactions will be protected from un-
controlled government inspection has become a question of constitu-
tional proportions. In United States v. Miller, I the Supreme Court held
that a bank depositor has no Fourth Amendment interest in the records
that his bank is required to keep in compliance with the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970.2 In Miller, respondent was indicted for various federal offen-
ses in connection with the operation of a still.' Prior to the indictment,
Treasury Department agents had served subpoenas upon the presidents
of two Georgia banks at which respondent maintained accounts. The
banks permitted the agents to inspect the records of respondent's ac-
counts and supplied the agents with copies of checks, deposit slips, and
financial statements. Subsequent to the indictment, Miller made a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence consisting of copies of his checks
and bank records. Miller alleged that the grand jury subpoenas that had
been served upon the two banks were defective,' and therefore the evi-
dence was seized illegally in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The district court denied the motion and the government introduced
several copies of Miller's checks and deposit slips as evidence. Conse-
quently, Miller was convicted, and he appealed.' The court of appeals
1. 96 S.Ct. 1619 (1976).
2. 12 U.S.C. §§1829b, 1959, 31 U.S.C. §§1051-1122 (1970). Section 1829b of the Act
provides:
Each insured bank shall make, to the extent that the regulations of the Secre-
tary so require,
(1) a microfilm or other reproduction of each check, draft, or similar instru-
ment drawn on it and presented to it for payment; and
(2) a record of each check, draft, or similar instrument received by it for
deposit or collection, together with an identification of the party for whose
account it is to be deposited or collected, unless the bank has already made a
record of the party's identity pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.
31 C.F.R. 103.34(b) (1976) establishes regulations that require each bank to retain the
original or a copy of each check, draft or money order in excess of $100.00 drawn on the
bank or issued and payable to it.
3. The facts of the case are set forth in the Brief for Petitioner at 3-10, United States
v. Miller, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (1976).
4. Respondent claimed that "the subpoenas were defective because they were issued by
the U.S. Attorney rather than a court, no return was made to a court, and the subpoenas
were returnable on a date when the grand jury was not in session." Id. at 1622.
5. Miller was convicted of possession of an unregistered still, carrying on the business
of a distiller without giving bond and with intent to defraud the government of whiskey
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ruled that Miller was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the use
of a defective subpoena in obtaining copies of his bank records consti-
tuted an unlawful invasion of his privacy.' The court acknowledged that
the Supreme Court had recognized the constitutionality of the Bank
Secrecy Act's record-keeping requirements in California Bankers Asso-
ciation v. Schultz,7 but emphasized the safeguard which California
Bankers provided for depositors. The safeguard was that depositors
would be afforded the adequate protection of "existing legal process"
from improper government access to their records.' The appellate court
found that the depositor had the necessary constitutional standing to
challenge a defective subpoena which did not constitute sufficient legal
process.
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision,9 did not consider it necessary
to determine the validity of the subpoena. The Court held that Miller
did not have standing to allege an illegal search and seizure of the
tax, possession of 175 gallons of whiskey upon which no taxes had been paid, and conspir-
acy to defraud the United States of tax revenues. Brief for Petitioner at 9, United States
v. Miller, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (1976).
6. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 756 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (1976).
7. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). Many provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act concerning recordkeep-
ing and reporting of domestic and foreign bank records were challenged in this case. The
Court held in connection with the recordkeeping requirements that:
a. The Act does not violate the due process of the banks since there is a
sufficient nexus between the evil Congress sought to correct and the recordkeep-
ing procedure. Also, the Court found that the cost of such recordkeeping did not
place an unreasonable burden on the banks.
b. The Act does not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of depositors since
the mere maintenance of records constitutes no illegal search or seizure.
c. The Act does not violate the Fifth Amendment right of banks (a corpora-
tion has no constitutional privilege against self-incrimination) or depositors
(individual incriminated by evidence obtained from a third party has not had
his Fifth Amendment rights violated).
d. The American Civil Liberties Union's claim that the recordkeeping re-
quirement violates the First Amendment rights of its members is premature
because the government has not sought disclosure of any of its members' re-
cords.
The Court, however, reserved the question of whether the recordkeeping requirements
undercut a depositor's right to effectively challenge a third-party summons, declaring that
"Claims of depositors against the compulsion by lawful process of bank records involving
the depositor's own transactions must wait such process issues." Id. at 51-52.
See The Bank Secrecy Act and Expectation of Privacy, 43 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 237
(1974) in which the author discusses the questions concerning privacy left unanswered by
this decision.
8. 500 F.2d at 758.
9. Justice Powell presented the opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall dissented. 96 S.Ct. at 1626 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Id. at 1629 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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documents in violation of the Fourth Amendment."° This Note will ana-
lyze the Court's reasoning and will discuss the impact this decision will
have on an individual's attempt to preserve privacy in his banking re-
cords.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated. . . ." Under the Fourth
Amendment, the books and records of both individuals" and corpora-
tions 12 are protected from orders for production if such orders can, in
each case, be classified as "unreasonable."' 3 The subpoenaed party may
bring a motion before the court requesting that the subpoena be quashed
or modified if compliance with it would be unreasonable or oppressive. 4
If the motion is denied and evidence against the subpoenaed party is
discovered in his books and records, he may, in any resulting criminal
10. Id. at 1623.
11. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court held that the compulsory
production of a person's private books and papers was an unreasonable search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d
855 (8th Cir. 1956) the court held that the compelled production of one's books and records
through a subpoena for use in a criminal proceeding is as much within the guaranty of
the Fourth Amendment as is reaching them by means of a warrant.
12. In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), a subpoena requiring production of all
correspondence, contracts and reports between one party and six other companies was
described as too broad and thus constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. In Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the Court held that the rights
of a corporation against unlawful searches and seizures are to be protected.
13. The definition of "reasonableness" differs for individuals and corporations. See J.
G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-PRE-TRIAL RIGHTS 196 (1972), in which
the author explains the difference:
What would be an unreasonable search and seizure in the case of an individual
who could claim the privilege against self-incrimination would not necessarily
be unreasonable in the case of a subpoena directed at a corporation, for neither
a corporate officer nor a custodian of corporate papers, ordered to produce
corporate papers, is protected by the Fifth Amendment.
In See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court gave a definition of reasonableness for a
corporation:
It is now settled that, when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books
or records, the Fourth Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently
limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compli-
ance will not be unreasonably burdensome.
Id. at 544.
14. FED. R. CaM. P. 17(c) states:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce
the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on
motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would
be unreasonable or oppressive.
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proceeding, move to suppress the evidence by alleging an illegal search
or seizure."
Responding to the motion to suppress in Miller, the Court held that
the subpoenaed records were the property of the bank, not the deposi-
tor, 1 and subsequently concluded that respondent's Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated. 7 The Court previously has held that in order
for a person to have standing to allege an illegal search or seizure, the
search or seizure must have been directed against him." The defendant
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) states:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the
property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property
which was illegally seized. . . . If the motion is granted the property shall be
restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial.
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), wherein the Court held that evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from a criminal trial.
A denial of a motion to quash a subpoena is not an appealable order. If the defendant
complies with the subpoena, he can still object to the introduction of the subpoenaed
material at a subsequent criminal trial. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971).
16. 96 S.Ct. at 1623. The Court stated that:
The documents subpoenaed here are not respondent's private papers. Unlike the
claimant in Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership nor possession. In-
stead, these are the business records of the bank.
17. The Court reasoned that the depositor takes a risk that the information he voluntar-
ily conveys to his bank could be relayed to the government. 96 S.Ct. at 1624. The Fourth
Amendment does not protect information obtained from a third party. In Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the Court held that the use of testimony of a government
informer did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a defendant who was convicted
of attempting to bribe jurors. The Court commented that the Fourth Amendment does
not protect a defendant's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides
his crime will not reveal it. In Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), the Court held
that the use of an electronic device to enable a government agent to overhear conversation
does not violate the Fourth Amendment when the device has not been planted by an
unlawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area.
18. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), in which the Court held in
discussing whether defendant had standing to challenge the search warrant issued inci-
dent to his arrest that:
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search
was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the
use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at
someone else.
Id. at 261.
See also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1967), in which the Court noted that:
The established principle of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can
be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search
itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging
evidence.
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is not considered to be the aggrieved victim of an illegal search and
seizure directed against a third person. Therefore, no matter how dam-
aging the evidence obtained from that person may be to the defendant,
he has no standing to bring a motion to suppress it. The Supreme Court
applied this principle in Donaldson v. United States"5 in which it refused
to permit defendant to challenge an Internal Revenue Service summons
served upon his former employer, which requested production of defen-
dant's employment and wage records. The Court held that the defen-
dant did not have the standing required to challenge a summons di-
rected to a third party seeking documents and records in which the
defendant had no proprietary interest.2
The use of a proprietary interest test would be a simple way in which
to dispose of an individual's challenge to the seizure of records not in
his possession. However, the obvious impediment to that manner of
disposition is that the definition of standing has been broadened by the
recognition "that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the
protection of privacy rather than property." 2 In Katz v. United States,22
the Supreme Court permitted the defendant to challenge evidence ob-
tained when government agents attached an electronic device to the
outside of a public telephone booth. In recognizing a violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment interests, the Court held that the gov-
ernment had violated the privacy upon which the defendant justifiably
had relied.2" The Court emphasized that "the Fourth Amendment pro-
Id. at 172.
For a general discussion of the history of standing in connection with the Fourth
Amendment, see Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and
Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1975). See also White &
Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1970), in
which the authors discuss the inadequacies of the present law of standing and suggest an
alternative test.
19. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
20. id. at 523.
21. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967), cited in United States v. Miller, 96
S.Ct. 1619, 1623 (1976). In Warden, the Court rejected the distinction between the seizure
of items of evidential value only (which previously could not be seized) and seizure of
instrumentalities, fruits or contraband. In its discussion of the history of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court stated:
We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the
protection of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded
fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts.
Id. at 304.
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Id. at 353. The Court further held that the government's use of an electronic listen-
ing device to record the defendant's conversations "constituted a 'search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
[Vol. 26:146
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tects people, not places. What a person. . . seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected.""4
Subsequent decisions relied on Katz in dealing with evidentiary chal-
lenges brought under the Fourth Amendment. These opinions utilized
the test of whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy regarding the seized items when a possessory interest could not be
asserted. 5 In Mancusi v. DeForte,16 the Supreme Court found that a
union official, DeForte, had standing to challenge the warrantless sei-
zure of union records from an office he shared with other union officials.
In analyzing the facts of that case, the Court acknowledged that the
documents were not DeForte's personal papers and the premises were
not his private office. Nevertheless, the Court considered the circum-
stances that surrounded the working arrangement. They concluded that
DeForte reasonably could have expected that only the union officials
and their guests would enter the office and that the records would not
be disturbed without their permission."
24. Id. at 351-52.
25. In Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972), the Court remanded the case to
the district court to consider whether defendant had standing to challenge an allegedly
invalid warrant used to seize evidence from his father's farm. The Court stated that the
lower court must determine whether defendant had an interest in connection with the
searched premises that would give rise to a "reasonable expectation of freedom from
government intrusion" upon the premises.
In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), the Court held in a plurality opinion that no
expectation of privacy was violated in the taking of exterior paint samples from defen-
dant's vehicle which was parked in a public lot.
Illinois courts have adopted the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test for determin-
ing standing. See People v. Fleming, 36 Ill.App.3d 612, 345 N.E.2d 10 (1st Dist. 1975);
People v. Pohlmann, 13 Ill.App.3d 779, 300 N.E.2d 302 (4th Dist. 1973).
In People v. Krivda, 5 Cal.3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal.Rptr. 62 (1970), vacated and
remanded, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), af'd on same grounds, 8 Cal.3d 572, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 521 (1973), the court held that when defendants placed contraband in trash barrels
and subsequently placed barrels adjacent to the street for pickup by rubbish collector they
did not abandon the trash but retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. An
Illinois appellate court has recently determined that Krivda is not persuasive authority
and found no expectation of privacy in curbside trash. People v. Huddleston, 38 Ill.
App.3d 277, 347 N.E. 2d 76 (3d Dist. 1976).
26. 392 U.S. 364 (1968). In relying upon its decision in Katz, the Court stated:
The Court's recent decision in Katz . . . makes it clear that the capacity to
claim the protection of the Amendment depends not upon a property right in
the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a
reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.
Id. at 368.
27. The fact that another union member could have voluntarily provided the govern-
ment with copies of the documents or that the government could have subpoenaed the
19761
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The Supreme Court has continued to employ the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test in determining whether a defendant has standing to
allege an illegal search or seizure.28 However, the use of the test did not
necessarily result in a finding favorable to the individual. In Couch v.
United States," the Court denied standing to an individual who at-
tempted to challenge an Internal Revenue Service summons which had
been served upon her accountant. The Court held that there was not a
sufficient expectation of privacy in regard to the business and tax re-
cords delivered to an accountant for use in the preparation of tax re-
turns. The Court reasoned that far from expecting the records delivered
to the accountant to be kept confidential, the taxpayer should realize,
if not expect, that much of the information conveyed will be disclosed
on the tax return.3 0 Further, the Court emphasized that the accountant
is granted the discretion to determine what parts of the information will
be included or omitted on the return. Therefore, the client's expectation
of privacy in any portion of the records is not a reasonable one.
In apparent consistency with its prior decisions, the Court in Miller
stated that it was necessary to examine the legitimacy of the depositor's
expectation of privacy in the contents of the subpoenaed bank records.
The Court observed that the records were voluntarily conveyed to the
bank and exposed to bank employees in the ordinary course of busi-
ness." For these reasons alone, the Court concluded that the depositor
had no expectation of privacy in the records. Therefore, finding that the
defendant had no protected Fourth Amendment interest, the Court re-
ferred to the general rule that the "issuance of a subpoena to a third
party to obtain the records of that party does not violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of a defendant. '3
records properly did not alter the fact that there was an illegal search and seizure and
that the evidence had to be suppressed. "It is, of course, immaterial that the State might
have been able to obtain the same papers by means which did not violate the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 372 n.12.
28. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
29. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
30. Id. at 335.
31. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, confidential communications between a
person and a bank are not privileged information. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2286 (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961).
32. 96 S.Ct. at 1624. Prior to Miller, most federal courts used this rule to conclude that
a depositor could not challenge the subpoena or summons of his bank account records
because they belonged to a third party. See United States v. Nat'l Bank, 454 F.2d 1249
(7th Cir. 1972) (the customer has neither a proprietary nor custodial interest in bank
records); United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1013
(1970) (customer has no standing because records are not his property); Harris v. United
States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969) (customers have no rights in the records of their bank);
[Vol. 26:146
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Although Miller and Mancusi were based on similar facts, the hold-
ings which resulted are quite different. The Court in Miller found that
a bank depositor did not have any expectation of privacy in his personal
banking records. In contrast, the Court in Mancusi held that a union
official had a reasonable expectation of privacy in professional union
documents, sufficient to support a grant of standing under the Fourth
Amendment. However, in both situations the documents had been "vol-
untarily" placed on the business premises and were "exposed" to var-
ious people for business and professional reasons. The Court in Miller
appeared to find these elements to be dispositive of the question of
respondent's standing. The Court in Mancusi looked beyond these fac-
tors to the actual business arrangement and concluded that a reasonable
expectation of privacy could be recognized. The major difference
between the two cases appears to be the willingness of the Court to
analyze closely the actual reasonable expectation of the individual
within the particular setting.
The Supreme Court in Miller supported its conclusion by asserting
that in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, Congress intended that an indi-
vidual would have no expectation of privacy in his banking records. 3
Examination of the Act reveals that this claim is not well supported.
The Court cited the purpose of the Act which is to require that the
records be maintained on the grounds that "they have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal tax, and regulatory investigations and proceed-
ings." 4 However, legislative history of the Act as reflected in the Report
of the House Committee on Banking and Currency indicates that Con-
gress did recognize the confidentiality of banking records. The report
stated:
It should be borne in mind that records to be maintained pursuant to
the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury will not be made auto-
matically available for law enforcement purposes. They can only be
obtained through existing legal process. 5
In holding the recordkeeping provisions of the Act constitutional in
California Bankers Association, the Supreme Court noted this legisla-
Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1968) (customer has no standing to
challenge the seizure of his bank records since records are the property of the bank); In re
Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965) (customer has no standing
because records are the property of the bank). But see Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J.Eq, 386,
146 A. 34 (1929) (customer has a property right in the information contained in his
account) and note 39 infra.
33. 96 S.Ct. at 1624.
34. Id.
35. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK RECORDS AND FOREIGN
TRANSACTIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 91-975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1970).
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tive intent and repeated the statement that access to the records would
be governed by existing legal process." Neither Congress nor the Court
defined what was meant by "existing legal process." The court of ap-
peals interpreted the language as granting standing to the depositor to
allege an unconstitutional seizure of bank records.37 The Supreme Court
disagreed and denied the depositor standing.
It is unfortunate that the Court did not analyze the question of expec-
tation of privacy in bank records more carefully since customers and
bank officials often do assume the existence of a confidential relation-
ship between customer and bank. Additionally, some courts have held
that if a bank divulges information concerning a depositor's account, it
can be held liable for breach of an implied contract. Justice Brennan,
36. 416 U.S. at 54. The Court held:
We see nothing in the Act which violates the fourth amendment rights of any
of these plaintiffs. Neither the provisions of Title I nor the implementing regula-
tions require that any information contained in the records be disclosed to the
government; both the legislative history and the regulations make specific refer-
ence to the fact that access to the records is to be controlled by existing legal
process.
37. 500 F.2d at 757. The court of appeals noted that the government cannot first require
a third party bank to copy all of a depositor's checks, and then, with an improper invoca-
tion of legal process, call upon the bank to allow inspection and reproduction of these
copies. It stated that:
In upholding the Bank Secrecy Act the divided California Bankers Court deter-
mined that the government could take the first of those steps without exceeding
constitutional limits. The Court, however, did not choose to abandon 90 years
of precedent by proclaiming open season on personal bank records. Indeed, in
rejecting the fourth amendment claims of the bank depositor plaintiffs, the
California Bankers majority, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, relied heavily
upon the proposition that depositors have adequate legal protection from im-
proper government access to their records. (emphasis added)
Id. at 757.
38. In Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 238, 243, 529 P.2d 590, 593, 118 Cal.Rptr.
166, 169 (1974), the court commented, "Representatives of several banks testified at the
suppression hearing that information in their possession regarding a customer's account
is deemed by them to be confidential." See also Note, Government Access to Bank
Records, 83 YALE L. J. 1439 (1974), in which the author maintains expectation of privacy
is supported by customary norms, practices and legal constraints; and Statement of Har-
old R. Arthur, Vice President, Wells Fargo Bank, Hearings on S. 2200 Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 178 (1974).
39. In Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961), the court
held that it is implicit in the contract of the bank with its customer or depositor that no
information may be disclosed by the bank or its employees concerning the customer's or
depositor's account, and that, unless authorized by law or by the customer or depositor,
the bank must be held liable for breach of the implied contract. In Milohnich v. First Nat'l
Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969), the court held that a depositor has asserted a
[Vol. 26:146
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dissenting in Miller,"0 noted approvingly that an expectation of privacy
had been found in Burrows v. Superior Court.' In Burrows, a bank
voluntarily relinquished copies of an accused's bank records without any
subpoena. The Burrows court argued that disclosure of one's financial
affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional since "it is almost impossible
to participate in the economic life of contemporary society without
maintaining a bank account."4 The Burrows decision also correctly
pointed out that information revealed in one's banking records is quite
extensive and personal. Reflecting these concerns, Justice Powell ob-
served in California Bankers Association that a significant extension of
the reporting requirements of the regulations established pursuant to
the Bank Secrecy Act would pose substantial constitutional problems
for him.43 Justice Powell stated:
Financial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities,
associations and beliefs. At some point, government intrusion upon
these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy. More-
over, the potential for abuse is particularly acute where, as here, the
legislative scheme permits access to this information without invoca-
tion of the judicial process."
Unfortunately, Justice Powell's concern for the expectation of privacy
in financial transactions nowhere is evident in his majority opinion in
Miller.
As a consequence of Miller, depositors have no secured protection
from unlimited government intrusion into their banking records. If a
bank raises no objections, the government can examine the private re-
cords of a depositor without the issuance of any legal process what-
cause of action in alleging a breach of an implied contractual obligation to keep the
customer's account secret. See Comment, Banks and Banking: Florida Adopts a Duty of
Secrecy, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 482 (1969).
40. 96 S.Ct. 1619, 1626 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. 13 Cal.3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal.Rptr. 166 (1975). This case was decided under
art. I, §13 of the California Constitution, the wording of which is practically identical to
the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated."
42. 13 Cal.3d at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 172 (1975).
43. 416 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 79. The implementing regulations of the Bank Secrecy Act require that a bank
"file a report on each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or
transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution which involved a transaction of
currency of more than $10,000.00." 31 C.F.R. §102.22 (1975). In California Bankers Ass'n,
Justice Powell was concerned that an extension of this reporting requirement would in-
trude upon areas of privacy. The regulations also require the bank's recordkeeping. By
denying a depositor standing to challenge a subpoena, the Court is granting the govern-
ment almost unlimited access to these records.
1976]
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soever.41 Although a bank may afford the depositor some limited protec-
tion by refusing to permit indiscriminate examination of accounts, the
government conceded that banks often permit law enforcement officials
to inspect their records without the issuance of a summons or sub-
poena." As the California Supreme Court warned:
To permit a police officer access to these records merely upon his re-
quest, without any judicial control as to relevancy or other traditional
requirements of legal process, and to allow the evidence to be used in
any subsequent criminal prosecution against a defendant, opens the
door to a vast and unlimited range of very real abuse of police power.,7
Miller has left the depositor with two alternatives to pursue to protect
the privacy of his records. The depositor may assert that a search of his
records without a subpoena violates his state constitutional rights as the
depositor successfully argued in Burrows v. Superior Court."5 The
depositor may also support the passage of pending legislation prohibit-
ing a bank from disclosing financial information unless the customer has
authorized the disclosure or the bank has been served with a lawful
45. See Costner & Grimmer, Search and Seizure of Bank Records and Reports, 92
BANKING L.J. 347 (1975) in which the authors state, "as government lawyers themselves
note in the California Bankers Association case, banking institutions frequently comply
voluntarily with requests by officials for access to files containing account-holders' trans-
actions." Id. at 349. See also Statement of Cecil Poole, Hearings on S. 2200 Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 185 (1974). (Mr. Poole, former U.S. Attorney in
California and former member of the District Attorney's Office of San Francisco testified
that he never had any difficulty getting bank records without any kind of subpoena
process); and Statement of Jack Anderson, Columnist: Accompanied by Joe Spear,
Hearings on S. 3814 and S. 3828 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., 135 (1972).
(Mr. Anderson produced copies of F.B.I. memos showing that the bank records of Jane
Fonda, Benjamin Spock, and Floyd McKissick were made available to the F.B.I. without
any subpoena).
46. 416 U.S. at 96.
47. 13 Cal.3d at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 172 (1975).
48. Justice Brennan in his dissent noted a trend of state courts relying on state constitu-
tional protections rather than the federal counterpart. His explanation is that these liber-
ties are being ignored in recent Supreme Court decisions. 96 S.Ct. 1626, 1629. See Wilkes,
The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62
Ky. L.J. 421 (1974), in which the author concludes that:
By lowering the level of constitutional protections the Burger Court has invited
the states to adopt standards higher than those of federal law. As a result, it is
to be expected that the tendency of state courts to evade the Burger Court by
basing rulings in favor of the rights of the accused on grounds of state law will
increase.
Id. at 450.
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subpoena. 9 It realistically may be expected that the existence of these
two courses of action will be small comfort to the interested depositor.
Miller should remain a disturbing decision to any depositor who, with
all due respect to the Supreme Court, does consider his personal bank-
ing transactions to be a part of his private affairs.
Nancy J. Nicol
49. S. 3349, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) and H.R. 13,757, 94th.Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)
both provide for service of a subpoena upon the bank and the customer. Both bills are in
committee at present.
SB 2010 and SB 2011 of the Illinois Legislature also require a subpoena. At present,
Governor Walker has exercised his amendatory veto power on the two bills in order to
clarify the language in the bill. The bill will become law if both houses of the legislature
accept the change by majority vote. See 122 Chicago Daily Law Bulletin 1 (1976).
